

A/B, 2, 10/85

Chief, Security Research Staff

17 February 1924

Chief, Technical Branch

Conference, 13 February 1951--

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1. On Saturday morning, [REDACTED], Chief, Security Research Staff, and [REDACTED], Chief, Technical Branch, met with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and discussed certain proposals in connection with the project known as [REDACTED]. In general, the project is as follows: In the United States, in [REDACTED] and elsewhere there are large numbers of [REDACTED] who are not citizens of the country in which they are residing but are [REDACTED] citizens. These [REDACTED] for various reasons such as absence from their families, possibly anti-Communist, possibly pro-Communist reasons, possibly business reasons, wish to return to their native homes in [REDACTED]. In general, the [REDACTED] project is concerned with the contacting of these people and sending them through covert channels back into [REDACTED] to perform intelligence missions for this Agency. F

2. More specifically, the [redacted] project contemplates a mechanism within the United States which will be a ways and means of contacting alien [redacted] in the United States (and elsewhere) and through agreements with the [redacted] [redacted] arrange to have them branded as "alien [redacted]" and removed from the United States as "undesirable aliens". By the use of these mechanisms, it is believed these alien [redacted] will be given legal entry into [redacted] [redacted] contemplates contacting these individuals carefully screening and testing them to see where their loyalties lie and indoctrinating these people so that they, when they return to [redacted] will carry out missions for this Agency, regardless of Communist screening and "brain washing".

3. The exact technique of contacting these people has not been worked out but through sympathetic "committees"; or "fake" left-wing organizations, it is believed these people can be reached and contacted.

4. The main problem in this case has been and always will be to determine A) where the exact sympathies of the individuals lie and b) how can we be sure the subject will perform the mission once he goes through the Iron Curtain and C) how can we train or indoctrinate these individuals so they can pass the "screening" or "brain washing" that probably will be given them by their captors.

Communists upon their return to [redacted]. Furthermore, in this connection, how can they be made to successfully resist this "brain washing" or "screening" so that they will be passed or accepted by the [redacted] and yet will ultimately carry out their assigned missions. F

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5. Toward this end, [redacted] and his group designated [redacted] to study this problem and to discover ways and means of assuring continuous loyalty of individuals dispatched to [redacted] for this Agency. In carrying out this assignment, [redacted] has been in [redacted] studying indoctrination techniques and human psychology with [redacted]. F

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In addition, [redacted] has apparently talked with others who have related interests along these lines. The writer and [redacted] cannot establish exactly why [redacted] was not referred to the ANTICOM work originally since it was obvious that [redacted] was to a certain extent aware of the ANTICOM work through contacts he had previously had with [redacted]. [redacted] apparently referred to [redacted] as [redacted]. Certain it is that [redacted] through [redacted] was familiar with the so-called [redacted] group of the [redacted]. As far as is known, [redacted] was Chairman of one of the groups under [redacted] and was responsible for [redacted] report along ANTICOM lines which this staff had previously reviewed and found in many ways quite unsatisfactory and empty. A
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6. Apparently, after six or eight weeks of study with [redacted] had come to the conclusion that the answer to this problem lies through selection, screening, indoctrination and ultimately, hypnosis. However, [redacted] and [redacted] had also apparently come to the conclusion that no tests had been designed as yet to determine the sixty-four dollar question; i.e. can individuals be commanded under hypnosis to do things that they would not otherwise do because of morals, training, ethics, etc.? This dead-end was revealed to the conference and since the Technical Branch and Lester [redacted] and [redacted] all arrived at this conclusion about three and one-half years ago, this discovery was not regarded as unique. C
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7. [redacted] and his group believe they have ample money and they can supply bodies and areas where actual tests can be made to establish whether or not individuals will act against their morals, ethics, upbringing, etc. Furthermore, under the cover of this loose project named [redacted] this type of experimentation can be financed and carried out without much additional approval or work within the Agency. It appeared obvious to all members at the conference that predictions could not accurately be made in the behavior of [redacted] being sent back into [redacted] unless certain very positive and definitive tests had been run and results very clearly established. C

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A B/3 7. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both stated that they felt Security would approve of the use of the [REDACTED] mechanism for carrying out ANTRICHOKE experimentation. Both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also felt the [REDACTED] project had great merit as certain fundamental facts could be demonstrated. It was also recognized that if [REDACTED] and his group could produce bodies and if certain very rough, primitive, and ultimate tests could be carried out then a more accurate prediction could be made in connection with the ultimate goal of [REDACTED] which is the running of [REDACTED] back into [REDACTED] for specific work for this Agency. A B/3

A 8. This problem was discussed for several hours. All hands participated. It was agreed in general that this type of work had to be carried out A) with Security clearance and not as a free-lance show and B) that it should be carried out with the technical aspects under the ANTRICHOKE experimentation program. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] felt that full Security approval could be obtained since [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] recognized the clear needs of a final type experimentation. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also felt the ANTRICHOKE machinery could be brought to bear fully in this type of work; i.e. scientific support (chemicals, etc.), support in hypnosis, medical and psychiatric support and technical support (tape recordings, movie picture cameras, regular cameras, etc.). Furthermore, in this connection, [REDACTED] pointed out that an ANTRICHOKE Tech was in the area [REDACTED] and one of their basic assignments was the carrying out of tests to determine whether or not ANTRICHOKE could go as far as control of the activities, thoughts, etc. of the individual in controlled missions and possibly over long distances and over considerable periods of time. F

A Bb 9. It was agreed at the conclusion of the conference that [REDACTED] would return to [REDACTED] and continue his training and on 1 March 1954, Monday, would return to Washington and come up with a series of tests and ideas that could be submitted for ANTRICHOKE study and later their possible implementation. It was agreed by Messrs. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to convey the general details of this conference to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] so that when the latter could be formally taken up, Security would be able to define its position and raise whatever objections might appear. It was also agreed that the Technical Branch would consider the matter from an ANTRICHOKE point of view and be prepared to assist in the designed tests and working out ways and means of carrying out experimentation which would be conclusive and would ultimately work to the success of the [REDACTED] project. B/3

A 10. Messrs. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] recognize the drastic moral problems involved in experimentation of this type and are of the opinion that whether or not this program can be set in motion

should be a decision for a very high level. Technically, however, this type of experimentation is essential to determine finally just how far human beings can be controlled (with or without their consent) using ARTICHOKE techniques.

B13 11. For matter of record, the Technical Branch believes we should take full advantage of the opportunity to act under this cover. The [REDACTED] mission itself has merit, particularly if through ARTICHOKE we can "guarantee" successful accomplishment of missions by its use irrespective of the "brain washing" and "scrapping" that may be applied to the returning agents by the [REDACTED]. The Technical Branch also believes that the only way these measures can be tested is by actual experimentation which must not be of the academic or clinical type and must be of a type that proves beyond any doubt certain premises that up to now have never been established. The Technical Branch recommends that we support this [REDACTED] work but believes that the entire operation should be authorized by Security and the technical and mechanical operations be placed squarely in the jurisdiction of the ARTICHOKE program and directly under the control of the Security Officer, [REDACTED].

A NOTE: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both emphasized the fact that this type of work must not be overwhelmed and overburdened in a maze of statistics, technical reports and learned academic experimentation, since previous experiences along these lines clearly indicate that when this appears the end results are almost always negative.

A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]